The Myth of Air Dominance: When Legacy, Lies, and Luxury Jets Collide

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The jet fighter is not a spreadsheet, it is a political argument written at Mach speeds. Across Europe and the United States the debate over what truly dominates the air has migrated from pilots’ ready rooms to public feeds, and it rarely gets honest. So here is the honest version, aimed at a Western audience that pays for these machines, cheers them at airshows, and may one day depend on them. Four aircraft sit at the heart of a surprisingly emotional contest: the F A 18C Hornet, the MiG 29 Fulcrum, the Su 57 Felon, and the F 22 Raptor. Each is a mirror of the nation that built it. Each carries its own mythology. And each, examined without ceremony, forces uncomfortable conclusions about technology, training, and the politics of airpower.

F 22 Raptor, The Aircraft That Ended the Dogfight Debate

The most controversial claim in modern fighter talk is also the simplest, the F 22 makes old air combat arguments irrelevant. Western pilots who train against it keep repeating a version of the same line, you never fight a Raptor because you never find one. Low observable shaping, radar absorbing materials, sensor fusion, and aggressive electronic attack conspire to turn the opponent into a statistic long before any dramatic turning fight begins. Critics call this an expensive myth, yet the quieter truth is far harsher, the Raptor kills the debate precisely because it short circuits the part of combat that looks heroic on camera.

The Raptor’s controversies are real, and they should be. The buy was capped, the production line was closed, and sustainment is costly. Those are not footnotes, they are strategic choices that left the United States with a small fleet of air superiority champions that cannot be readily replaced. That decision still angers many American and European air chiefs because it placed political optics ahead of deterrence mass. The counterpoint is equally incendiary, the F 22 is so far ahead in first shot advantage that quantity matters less than people admit, especially when networked with AWACS, surface sensors, and allied fighters. European audiences may bristle at the price tag, but ask NATO pilots which cockpit they would pick on day one of a shooting war and you will not get a split vote.

Su 57 Felon, Fifth Generation or Fifth Column to the Narrative

Russia calls the Su 57 a fifth generation fighter. Western analysts call it a moving target, part credible, part theatrical. The Felon’s planform and internal bays give it a lower signature than Flanker predecessors, its new sensors promise sophisticated passive detection, and its weapons portfolio is evolving. That is the technical story. The political story is sharper, until the jet appears in numbers with mature engines and export customers, it is as much a narrative weapon as an air superiority platform.

Here is the controversial take many avoid, the Su 57 is dangerous not because it equals the Raptor but because it tempts policymakers to underestimate it. Russian design culture has a habit of solving problems with ugly brilliance. The Felon may not be the stealth king from every angle, yet with long range missiles cued by ground based radars and drones, it only needs moments of ambiguity to be lethal. Dismissing it outright is a luxury no NATO planner can afford. At the same time, Europe should not let brochure language about generation labels drive strategy. The Felon forces a grown up conversation about integrated air defense ecosystems, not press release showdowns.

MiG 29 Fulcrum, The Charismatic Relic That Still Bites

The Fulcrum is the Cold War’s rock star. It looks fast sitting still, it throws flames at any throttle setting, and Eastern European air forces have flown it with proud stubbornness. At airshows it remains a crowd favorite because its high thrust to weight and agile control surfaces make for photogenic aerobatics. That charisma hides the bigger truth, in Western style networked warfare the baseline MiG 29 is short legged, maintenance heavy, and sensor limited. It was built for an era when ground controllers pushed vectors to interceptors and pilots used helmet sights to launch heaters at knife range.

Now comes the controversy, upgrades can make the Fulcrum relevant in narrow windows and that matters politically. Modernized radars, Western weapons integration, and digital avionics give refurbished MiG 29s a second act, particularly in nations that need credible air policing today rather than a clean sheet fleet tomorrow. There is an uncomfortable subtext here for European readers, sometimes keeping an old airframe nasty and good enough is the smarter deterrent than waiting a decade for perfection. The Fulcrum is not the queen of the chessboard, but in crowded airspace with ground based sensors feeding targets it can still take pieces off the table.

F A 18C Hornet, The Blue Collar Jet That Refuses to Retire

If the Raptor is an apex predator and the Su 57 a narrative disruptor, the legacy Hornet is the dependable union worker of Western airpower. In Swiss service and elsewhere it represents an unglamorous reality that triggers surprising internet rage, the Hornet’s mix of reliability, human factors design, and mature weapons makes it more useful more often than many newer jets. Pilots love it because it treats them kindly in bad weather and tight valleys. Maintainers love it because the jet was built by people who expected to fix things in the rain at night. Taxpayers should love it because it delivers credible defense at sane operating costs.

This leads to a deliciously controversial assertion, Western air defense would be weaker today if governments had chased every cutting edge promise and ignored the humble productivity of aircraft like the F A 18C. The Hornet cannot vanish on radar like a fifth gen fighter and it will not sprint like a Typhoon, yet it puts missiles on the right track, drops precision weapons when called, and shows up every day. For small European nations that prize readiness over theater, that is the point of an air force. No air defender ever frightened a cruise missile by winning a comment thread argument about generations.

Training, Tactics, and the Lie We Tell About Hardware

There is a lie Western audiences keep buying. It says the fighter with the best brochure wins. The United States has been trying to kill that lie since the first Red Flag, and Europeans know better every time they look at their maps. What wins is a human machine team that decides faster than the other side, that sees first, that refuses to be surprised. This is why the F 22 remains unbeatable in its designed role, why the Su 57 is more than a meme, why the Fulcrum can still ambush, and why the Hornet continues to be relevant. If you want a single sentence to keep, keep this one, the jet is a node, the kill chain is the weapon.

Here is where it gets uncomfortable for policymakers. Buying one or two poster worthy squadrons does not create deterrence. Building reliable tankers, electronic warfare escorts, hardened shelters, dispersed basing, and a culture of joint targeting does. The Raptor thrives when fed by that ecosystem. The Felon becomes dangerous when it parasitizes one. The Fulcrum pays its rent when plugged into one. The Hornet survives and contributes because it was designed to live in one. European voters hate paying for the unsexy pieces, but the unsexy pieces decide tomorrow.

Industry, Secrecy, and the Price of Being Right Too Early

Another controversy rarely discussed outside specialist circles sits at the intersection of procurement and pride. The F 22 was right too early. It solved problems the rest of the world had not yet learned to pose at scale, then it was frozen in time by political fatigue. The Su 57 is late and noisy, but that lateness means it can adopt lessons that Western jets learned painfully. The MiG 29 is old, which makes it a perfect host for affordable experimentation. The Hornet is mature, which makes it the most honest baseline for judging what modern sensors and weapons actually add.

For European industry this is a warning label. The point of a next generation program is not to win a press conference. It is to deliver overwhelming advantage at the right time in numbers that change an opponent’s behavior. That requires ruthless schedule discipline and boring logistics money. If your national plan cannot explain how a pilot in peacetime gets four times the annual training of his adversary, the avionics slide deck will not save you.

Who Really Rules the Sky

So who wins this four way argument. If the measure is first look and first shot in high end air dominance, the Raptor remains the benchmark because it erases the merge and punishes anyone who pretends otherwise. If the measure is strategic influence per news cycle, the Su 57 wins because it generates narratives that shape budgets and alliances even when its production numbers are modest. If the measure is survivable utility for small nations with limited budgets, the F A 18C proves that readiness beats rhetoric. If the measure is disruptive value from legacy airframes, the MiG 29 shows that upgrades can still shock complacent planners.

That answer will anger purists on every side. Good. Airpower that cannot survive criticism cannot survive contact.

A Western Case for Clarity

A clear headed Western strategy should treat these aircraft as lessons rather than idols. Keep the Raptor lethal and connected, not museum polished. Respect the Felon enough to design around its best day rather than your own optimism. Use Fulcrums and other legacy types as interim teeth for partners who cannot wait. Keep Hornets and similar workhorses funded until the replacement is not a promise but a parked jet with trained crews and stocked parts.

The sky does not care about national pride. It rewards the side that sees first, decides first, and shows up every day. The rest is applause.